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Computational Complexity of Determining
Which Statements about Causality Hold in
Different Space-Time Models
Vladik Kreinovich and Olga Kosheleva
University of Texas at El Paso, El Paso, TX 79968, USA
vladik@utep.edu, olgak@utep.edu
Abstract
Causality is one of the most fundamental notions of physics. It is
therefore important to be able to decide which statements about causality
are correct in different models of space-time. In this paper, we analyze
the computational complexity of the corresponding decision problems. In
particular, we show that:
• for Minkowski space-time, the decision problem is as difficult as
Tarski’s decision problem for elementary geometry, while
• for a natural model of primordial space-time, the corresponding decision problem is of the lowest possible complexity among all possible
spacetime models.
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Introduction

Formulation of the problem. Causality is one of the most fundamental
notions of physics. It is usually described by a reflexive binary relation a ≤ b
meaning that an event a can influence an event b. It is important to study
different properties of the causality relation.
From the logical viewpoint, a natural way to describe such properties is
to start with elementary statements of the type a ≤ b, and to combine these
statements by using propositional connectives ∨ (“or”), & (“and”), ¬ (“not”),
and quantifiers ∀a and ∃a over events. For each space-time model, i.e., for each
set of events E with a given causality relation ≤, the resulting statements form
a first order theory of this causality relation ≤.
We face two natural questions. The first is a fundamental question: is the
corresponding first order theory decidable? In other words, is there an algorithm
that, given a formula, decides whether this formula holds in the given space-time
model? For several reasonable space-time models, the corresponding theory
is, in principle, decidable, For such models, we face a second more practical
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question: how difficult can this decision be? Or, in precise terms, what is the
computational complexity of the corresponding decision problem?
Our interest in this topic dates back to the 1970s paper co-authored by one
of us with D. Grigoriev [15]. In that paper, we were mainly interested in the first
fundamental question: is the corresponding theory decidable? Since the 1970s,
a lot of work has been done about the computational complexity of different
algorithms and problems, so we decided to revisit the topic of that paper – this
time from the computational complexity viewpoint.
What we plan to do. In this paper, we start with the simplest physical model
of space-time – the Minkowski space-time. From the fundamental viewpoint,
the decision problem is solvable: we can use, e.g., Tarski’s decision procedure
for formulas from elementary geometry (see descriptions below) – or, better
yet, modern faster decision procedures for these formulas. Our new (somewhat
unexpected) result is that the decision problem for the first order theory of
causality for the Minkowski space-time is as difficult as the general decision
problem of elementary geometry.
We then analyze the general case of abstract space-time models, and we
show that for every non-trivial space-time, the decision problem is (at least)
PSPACE-hard.
We then turn to another extreme – possible models of “primordial” spacetime, i.e., space-time near the beginning of the Universe. We provide some arguments that this space-time should be maximally symmetric, and we analyze the
computational complexity of the decision problem for causality theories in this
maximally symmetric model. For this model, we describe an exponential-time
decision proecedure – arguably the fastest possible among different causalityrelated decision procedures (unless it turns out that P=NP).
Finally, we provide arguments showing, crudely speaking, that there should
not be any intermediate drastically different space-time models: a natural transition from the primordial space-time should lead us to causality models similar
to the Minkowski one.
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Case Study: First Order Causality Theory for
Minkowski Space-Time

What is Minkowski space-time? Reminder. Let us start with the
simplest model of space-time – Minkowski space-time, a 4-dimensional space
E = R4 with the causality relation
a = (a0 , a1 , a2 , a3 ) ≤ b = (b0 , b1 , b2 , b3 ) ↔
p
a = b ∨ b0 − a0 ≥ (b1 − a1 )2 + (b2 − a2 )2 + (b3 − a3 )2 .
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Comment. In this formula, we assume that the units for measuring time and
space are selected in such a way that the speed of light c is equal to 1. If we use
other units, then instead of b0 − a0 ≥ . . . we should write c · (b0 − a0 ) ≥ . . .
Reduction to Tarski’s elementary geometry. The above causality relation can easily be described as a propositional combination of polynomial
equalities and inequalities:
(a0 = b0 & a1 = b1 & a2 = b2 & a3 = b3 )∨
(b0 > a0 & (b0 − a0 )2 ≥ (b1 − a1 )2 + (b2 − a2 )2 + (b3 − a3 )2 ).
Thus, all the formulas of the Minkowski causality first order theory can be
described in terms of the first order theory of real numbers, in which:
• objects are real numbers,
• elementary formulas are of the type x = y, x ≥ 0, x = y + z, and x = y · z,
and
• general formulas can be obtained by using propositional connectives and
quantifiers.
In principle, we can also add more general elementary formulas of the type
P ≥ Q, where P and Q are polynomials with integer coefficients. However,
this addition does not seriously change the expressive ability of this language.
Indeed, if we parse each polynomial, i.e., represent it as a sequence of elementary
arithmetic operations, we can describe such more complex formulas in terms of
simpler ones. For example, computing x1 + x22 means that we first compute
z1 = x2 · x2 , and then y as y = x1 + z1 . Thus, the formula y = x1 + x22 can be
reformulated as ∃z1 (z1 = x2 · x2 & y = x1 + z1 ).
In the late 1940s, A. Tarksi has proven that there exists an algorithm which
decides whether each formula from this first order theory of real numbers is
decidable; see, e.g., [31]. He called this theory elementary geometry because if
we represent each point by its coordinates, then practically all the problems of
elementary geometry can be described in this language.
Due to the reduction, Tarski’s procedure leads to a decision procedure
for the first order causality theory for Minkowski space-time. Since
first order causality formulas can be described in terms of elementary geometry,
3

the existence of Tarski’s algorithm solves the first (fundamental) problem for
the Minkowski space-time: namely, by using Tarski’s algorithm, we can decide
whether a given first order causality formula is true or not.
What is the computational complexity of this decision problem?
Tarksi’s original algorithm is very inefficient: its worst-case time complexity
grows faster than an ¡exponential
function 2n or than any iterations of this func¢
n

n
2( 2 )

tion, such as 2(2 ) , 2
, etc.
However, later, much more efficient algorithms have been produced. This
research started with the fundamental fundamental results of M. Ben-Or,
D. Kozen, and J. Reif [5] and J. Canny [9]. In particular, J. Canny showed
that many problems are in PSPACE – which is more efficient than EXPTIME
in practice.
G. E. Collins and H. Hong [10] describe a general algorithm which requires
n
only doubly exponential time ∼ 2(2 ) . In J. H. Davenport and J. Heintz [11],
it was proven that the doubly exponential time is also a lower bound for the
general quantifier elimination problem, so exponential time is the worst-case
complexity for elementary geometry.
Results from [5] and [9] were generalized by J. Renegar [27]. In particular,
J. Renegar produced exponential-time decision procedures for the case when we
only have universal quantifiers.
Overall, the algorithms have been improved not only in terms of “theoretical” (asymptotic) complexity, but also in the sense of practical implementations.
These efficiency improvements have led to numerous practical applications ranging from control to transportations to epidemiology; see, e.g., S. Ratchan [26]
and references therein.
Since, as we have mentioned, for some subclasses of the class of all first
order formulas, there are faster algorithms, a natural question appears: If we
only restrict ourselves to causality-related formulas, can we have a more efficient
decision algorithm than in the general case?
Our first result. Our first result is that the complexity of the decision problem for causality formulas is exactly the same as the complexity of decision
problem for formulas of elementary geometry.
Specifically, we have already shown that there is a reduction from the first
order theory of Minkowski causality to elementary geometry. This reduction
requires time which is linear in the size of the original formula and increases the
size of the formula by a constant factor. It turns out that a similar reduction is
possible in the other direction:
Proposition 1. There exists a linear-time reduction from the first-order theory of elementary geometry to the first-order theory of Minkowski causality relation.
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Conclusion. Thus, the computational complexity of the decision problem for
first order formulas of the Minkowski causality relation is the same as for the
elementary geometry. As a corollary, we can conclude that for the Minkowski
causality, the complexity of the decision problem is doubly exponential.
Related open question. As we have mentioned earlier, several fragments of the
first order theory of real numbers have much faster decision procedures. In
particular, Canny has shown that entire existential fragment is in PSPACE
– hence much more efficient than EXPTIME in practice. It is desirable to
find physically interesting classes of causality formulas that correspond to such
fragments – e.g., to the existential fragment.
Proof.
1◦ . A theoretical possibility for this proof comes from the known fact that the
Minkowski causality uniquely determines a linear structure on the set of events.
Moreover, every mapping R4 → R4 which preserves causality is a superposition
of Lorentz transformations, rotations, shifts, and dilations (homotheties). This
was first proven by A. D. Alexandrov [1, 4] (see also A. D. Alexandrov [2, 3]
and E. C. Zeeman [33]).
Historical comment. The transformations described here are the conformal
transformations. It has been well known for a long time that these transformations leave the light cones invariant. It has also been known that the only
smooth (= differentiable) transformations which preserve causality are the above
superpositions. However, the fact that same results holds for arbitrary mappings
(without assumptions of smoothness or continuity) was only proven in 1950.
In [32], we have actually used A. D. Alexandrov’s results to provide a physical
explanation for standard arithmetic operations (addition, multiplication, etc.)
on the numbers field.
We cannot directly use the above proofs because these proofs use sets, i.e.,
second-order objects which go beyond the first-order descriptions. However, it
turns out that the main ideas of these proofs can be modified into a first-order
construction. This will enable us to describe formulas of elementary geometry
in causality terms.
Comment. In our proof, in addition to the original ideas from Alexandrov’s
papers, we also use ideas proposed by W. Benz [6, 7], J. A. Lester [19, 20, 21, 22],
and K. Svozil [29, 30].
Specifically, in our proof, in effect, we use the vector space structure on R4
and the fact that scalar multiplication is defined on it to encode addition and
multiplication of real numbers.
def

2◦ . A physically important part of the future cone a+ = {b : a ≤ b} of a given
event a is the boundary of this cone. From the physical viewpoint, the future
5

cone consists of all the events b which can be reached from a by transmissions
with speed c or less (where c is the speed of light). The boundary of this cone
corresponds to events which can be reached only by transmissions traveling
exactly with the speed of light. Let us denote the fact that b is at the boundary
˙
of this cone by a≤b.
This relation is a particular case of the causality relation. It can be distinguished by the general causality relation by the following fact:
˙ then the interval {d : a ≤ d ≤ b} is linearly ordered:
• when a≤b,
@
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• when a ≤ b and ¬(a≤b),
then the corresponding interval is not linearly
ordered:
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˙ by an equivalent first-order causality
Thus, we can describe the relation a≤b
formula:
a ≤ b & ∀d∀e ((a ≤ d ≤ b & a ≤ e ≤ b) → (d ≤ e ∨ e ≤ d)).

˙ and a 6= b. A straight line which goes through the points a and b
3◦ . Let a≤b
is called a null line because along this line, the proper time
p
(b0 − a0 )2 − (b1 − a1 )2 − (b2 − a2 )2 − (b3 − a3 )2
is equal to 0.
We can describe the fact that an event d ∈ R4 is on the same null line ab
˙ relation to each
as the events a and b as follows: all three events must be in ≤
other, i.e.,
˙ ∨ d≤a)
˙ & (b≤d
˙ ∨ d≤b).
˙
(a≤d
6

Let us denote this formula by d ∈ ab.
˙ and b 6= a. We can now describe what it means for a point d
4◦ . Now, let a≤b
to be in a null hyper-plane – a tangent hyper-plane to the cone a+ which passes
through the line ab. Geometrically, this means that d is either on the line ab,
or on no null cone starting at any point e from the null line ab.
Indeed, any point on top of this tangent hyper-plane is covered by the boundary of e+ for some e, while points below this hyper-plane are covered by the
boundary of e− for some e.
In first order terms, the condition that d is on this hyper-plane can be
described as follows:
˙ ∨ d≤e))
˙
(∃e (e ∈ ab & (e≤d
→ d ∈ ab.
We will denote this condition by d ∈ H(ab).
5◦ . In the 4-D space, a null hyper-plane H(ab) is 3-dimensional (i.e., of codimension 1). Thus, the intersection of two null hyper-planes H(ab) and H(ab0 ),
with b0 6∈ ab, is of dimension 2. Similarly, the intersection of three null hyperplanes H(ab), H(ab0 ), and H(ab00 ), with b0 6∈ ab, b00 6∈ ab, and b00 6∈ ab0 , is a
straight line. Once can check that:
• this straight line is space-like (i.e., on this line, no two points are related
by the causality relation), and
• an arbitrary space-like line can be thus obtained.
So, we can define space-like lines in first order terms.
Comment. If, instead of the 4-D Minkowski space, we consider a space of a
different dimension d ≥ 3, then we need an intersection of d − 1 such hyperplanes.
˙ a≤b
˙ 0 , and b0 6∈ ab.
6◦ . Now, let us fix three events a, b, and b0 such that a≤b,
Since b0 6∈ ab, these three points define a (2-dimensional) plane. A point e
belongs to this plane if and only if there is a space-like line which contains e
and intersects with both null lines ab and ab0 .
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This can be easily described in first order terms, so we get a description of
this plane. In the following reduction, we will only use events from this plane.
(So, all the formulas obtained after reduction should start with ∀a∀b∀b0 .)
7◦ . To get a reduction, we need to describe:
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• real numbers,
• the relation ≤ on real numbers, and
• two arithmetic operations with these real numbers:
– addition and
– multiplication.
Once we have that, any formula from the first order theory of real numbers will
be interpreted in causality terms.
8◦ . Real numbers will be described by events from the line ab.
The event a represents 0, the event b represents 1, and an arbitrary number
def
α ∈ R is represented by the corresponding point b(α) = a + α · (b − a) ∈ ab. In
this representation, the standard order ≤ between the real numbers corresponds
to the causality relation between the corresponding events:
α ≤ β ↔ b(α) ≤ b(β).
@
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Because of this definition, every point d ∈ ab represents a number – the number
α for which b(α) = d.
This number can given a geometric interpretation if we formally introduce
on R4 an Euclidean metric ρ in which the distance between a and b is exactly 1:
ρ(a, b) = 1. In this metric, the number α corresponding to the event d is simply
equal to the (signed) distance ρ(a, d) between the event d and the fixed point
a.
9◦ . To describe addition, we must be able to shift “intervals” along the null
line ab. This can be done as follows. By using two parallel null lines and two
parallel space-like lines, we can form parallelepipeds and thus, make sure that
on a parallel null line, we have an interval a0 d0 which is of the same size as the
original interval ad:
@
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a@ ¡a0
¡@

¡¡

8

Then, by using another parallelepiped, we can move the interval a0 d0 back into
the original null line ab, this time into a different place, as a00 d00 :
@
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d∗00¡
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By using this construction, we can arbitrarily shift any interval along the null
line ab.
10◦ . Now, addition z = x+x0 can be described as follows. In our representation,
both real numbers x and x0 are represented by points d ∈ ab and d0 ∈ ab for
which ρ(a, d) = x and ρ(a, d0 ) = x0 .

a¨
∗§

x0
∗¦
x d

d0
¥
∗

By using a construction described in Part 9 of this proof, we then shift an
interval ad0 onto the same null line ab in such a way that the shifted interval de
starts with the point d.

a¨
∗

x0
∗
d§

d0
¥
∗
x0

e
∗¦

Since the length ρ(a, d) of the interval ad is equal to x and the length ρ(d, e)
of the interval de on the same line ab is equal to x0 , the length ρ(a, e) of the
combined interval ae is thus equal to x + x0 .

a¨
∗§

x + x0
∗¦
§
x d

x0

e¥
∗¦

So, the event e is the desired representation for the sum x + x0 .
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Comment. Strictly speaking, the above procedure only works for adding positive real numbers, so we need additional constructions corresponding to different
signs. The signs are easy to describe in first order terms, since:
• non-negative numbers are represented by events d ≥ a, while
• non-positive numbers are represented by events d ≤ a.
11◦ . To describe multiplication, we need:
• to have an alternative representation of real numbers, on the null line ab0 ,
and
• to be able to move numbers between the original and the new (alternative)
representations. representations.
In the alternative representation, we represent real numbers by points from the
null line ab0 , with 0 represented by a, 1 represented by b0 , and an arbitrary
def
number α ∈ R by a point b0 (α) = a + α · (b0 − a) ∈ ab0 .
@
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If we have a point d ∈ ab (d 6= a) representing a real number, then we can
describe the corresponding point d0 ∈ ab0 representing the same real number as
follows: it is the only point d0 ∈ ab0 for which the space-like line dd0 is parallel to
the space-like line bb0 (since we restricted ourselves to the 2-dimensional plane,
parallel simply means no common points).
@∗
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For an event b representing number 1, the corresponding point is a point b0 , at
def
a distance ρ0 = ρ(a, b0 ). In general:
• If we have an event d ∈ ab which represent a number x = ρ(a, d), then
in the alternative representation, this same number is represented by an
event d0 ∈ ab0 for which ρ(a, d0 ) = x · ρ0 .
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• Vice versa, an arbitrary event d0 ∈ ab0 represents a real number x =
ρ(a, d0 )
. In the original representation, this same number is represented
ρ0
ρ(a, d0 )
by an event d for which ρ(a, d) = x =
.
ρ0
12◦ . We are now ready to show how multiplication can be described.
Similarly to addition, it is sufficient to describe multiplication of positive
real numbers; other cases can be handled in a similar manner. In the case of
positive real numbers, we need to multiply two given real numbers x > 0 and
x0 > 0. According to our representation of real numbers,
• the value x is represented by an event d for which the distance ρ(a, d) is
equal to x, and
• the value x0 is represented by an event d0 for which the distance ρ(a, d0 ) is
equal to x0 .
By using the construction from Part 11 of this proof, we can find an event
d00 ∈ ab0 which represent the same number x0 as the event d0 ∈ ab.
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There exists a space-line line going through the points b and d00 . We then find
a line which is parallel to bd00 and which goes through d. This line intersects
with a null-line ab0 at some point e0 .
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Since the lines bd00 and de0 are parallel, the triangles abd0 and ade0 are similar.
Thus, we have the following relation between the lengths of the corresponding
sides:
ρ(a, d)
ρ(a, e0 )
=
.
ρ(a, d00 )
ρ(a, b)
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By our choice of metric, ρ(a, b) = 1. By our choice of d as a representation of
the value x, we have ρ(a, d) = x; so, the ratio in the right-hand side is equal to
ρ(a, e0 )
x/1 = x. From
= x, we conclude that ρ(a, e0 ) = x · ρ(a, d0 ).
ρ(a, d00 )
The event d00 represents the value x0 in the alternative representation, so
ρ(a, d00 ) = x0 · ρ0 . Thus, we conclude that ρ(a, e0 ) = x · (x0 · ρ0 ) = (x · x0 ) · ρ0 .
By definition of the alternative representation, this event represents a number
ρ(a, e0 )
= x · x0 .
ρ0
By applying to the event e0 ∈ ab0 the construction from Part 11, we get a point
e ∈ ab which represents the same number x · x0 in the original representation.
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13◦ . Summarizing: we can represent real numbers, inequality between real
numbers, addition, and multiplication. We thus have the desired representation
of the elementary geometry in the first order theory of Minkowski causality. The
proposition is proven.
Comment. In our definition and in the proof, we mainly considered 4dimensional space-time. However, one can easily check that our proof applies
to the Minkowski space-time model of an arbitrary dimension ≥ 3.

3

General Case

Discussion. In the previous section, we have shown that for the Minkowski
space-time, the decision problem has double exponential complexity. A natural question is: can this decision problem be much easier for other space-time
models?
In this section, we will show that for every space-time model which is nondegenerate in some reasonable sense, the decision problem ofr the corresponding
causality theory is PSPACE-hard.
This means that (unless PSPACE=P), the decision problem always requires
at least exponential time. In the following section, we will provide an example
of a physically reasonable space-time model for which the exponential time is
sufficient.
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PSPACE: reminder for physicist readers. The main result of this section
is formulated in terms of the complexity class PSPACE. This is a class which
is very familiar to every computer scientist. However, our motivations come
from physics, and we therefore hope that some physicists will read this paper as
well; for these readers, we provide a brief description of this complexity class.
Computer science readers can skip directly to the subsection titled “Our second
result”.
It is well known that some algorithms are practically useful, while some
other algorithms are computationally useless: even for reasonable size inputs,
they require time which exceeds the number of particles in the Universe. This
distinction is very different to formalize. Usually:
• algorithms for which the computation time tA (x) is bounded by some
polynomial P (n) of the length n = len(x) of the input (e.g., linear-time,
quadratic-time, etc.) are practically useful, while
• for practically useless algorithms, the computation time grows with the
size of the input much faster than a polynomial.
In view of this empirical fact, in theoretical computer science, algorithms are
usually considered feasible if their running time is bounded by a polynomial of
n. The class of problems which can be solved in polynomial time is usually
denoted by P; see, e.g., [24].
Not all practically useful problems can be solved in polynomial time. To
describe such problems, researchers have defined several more general classes of
problems. One of the most well known classes is the class NP. By definition,
this class consists of all the problems which can be solved in non-deterministic
polynomial time – meaning that if we have a guess, we can check, in polynomial
time, whether this guess is a solution to our problem.
Most computer scientists believe that NP6=P, i.e., that some problems from
the class NP cannot be solved in polynomial time. However, this inequality
has not been proven, it is still an open problem. What is known is that some
problems are NP-hard, i.e., any problem from the class NP can be reduced to
each of these problems in polynomial time. One of such NP-hard problems is
the problem SAT of propositional satisfiability: given a propositional formula F ,
i.e., a formula obtained from Boolean (yes-no) variables x1 , . . . , xn by using &,
∨, and ¬, check whether there exist values x1 , . . . , xn which make this formula
true.
NP-hardness of SAT means that if NP6=P (i.e., if at least one problem from
the class NP cannot be solved in polynomial time), then SAT also cannot be
solved in polynomial time. In other words, SAT is the hardest of the problems
from this class.
It is known that all the problems from the class NP can be solved in exponential time. Indeed, for a problem of size n, there are ≤ an possible guesses,
where a is the size of the corresponding alphabet, so we can simply try all these
guesses one by one.
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This sequential testing requires only a polynomial amount of space. There
is a larger class of problems PSPACE, the class of all the problems which can
be solved by using polynomially many computer cells. Problems from the class
PSPACE can also be solved in exponential time.
In the class PSPACE, there are also problems (called PSPACE-hard) to
which all other problems from this class can be reduced in polynomial time. So,
if a problem is proven to be PSPACE-hard, this means that – unless PSPACE
is equal to P (or to some sub-exponential class) – we cannot solve this problem
is less than exponential time.
One example of such PSPACE-hard problems is quantified satisfiability
(QBF). In QBF, we consider formulas which are obtained from the Boolean
variables by using propositional connectives and quantifiers ∀x and ∃x over
possible values of the corresponding Boolean variables [24].
Our second result. In view of the above reminder, proving that a problem
is PSPACE-hard means, in effect, that it cannot be solved faster than in exponential time. The following simple result shows that for every non-trivial
space-time model, the causality decision problem is PSPACE-hard – and thus,
in effect, cannot be solved faster than in exponential time.
As we have mentioned in the Introduction, we are only interested in the
causality relation. Therefore, we arrive at the following definition of a spacetime model.
Definition 1. By a space-time model, we mean a pair (E, ≤), where E is a
set and ≤ is a reflexive binary relation on E.
Definition 2. We call a space-time model non-trivial if there exist two events
a and b for which a 6≤ b.
Comment. The only space-time models which we exclude are the ones for which
a ≤ b for all a and b. For such models, the decision problem is trivial.
Proposition 2. For every non-trivial space-time model (E, ≤), the decision
problem for the first order causality theory of the corresponding relation ≤ is
PSPACE-hard.
Proof. To prove that this causality-related problem is PSPACE-hard, we will
reduce QBF (a known PSPACE-hard problem) to this problem. By definition,
the fact that QBF is PSPACE-hard means that every problem from the class
PSPACE can be reduced to QBF; since, as well will show, QBF can be reduced to
the causality problem, this means that every problem from the class PSPACE
can be reduced to the causality problem – i.e., that the causality problem is
indeed PSPACE-hard.
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In the desired reduction of QBF to the causality problem, we assign, to each
Boolean variable xi , a pair of event-valued variables ai and bi . In the formula
F from QBF,
• each occurrence of the Boolean variable xi is then replaced with the formula ai ≤ bi ,
• propositional connectives remain intact, and
• each quantifier ∀xi is replaced with ∀ai ∀bi , and each quantifier ∃xi is
replaced with ∃ai ∃bi .
def

For every space-time model, we can select bi = ai and get xi = (ai ≤ bi ) to
be true. Since we assumed that the space-time is non-trivial, there also exist
values ai and bi for which ai 6≤ bi . Thus, each of the corresponding variables xi
can take exactly two possible values: “true” and “false”.
So, the resulting formula of the causality theory is true if and only if the
original formula from QBF was true. The proposition is proven.

4

Second Case Study: A Reasonable Model of
Primordial Space-Time

Main physical idea. In this section, we go to the other extreme: from the
Minkowski space-time which reasonably describes current space-time (at least
locally), we go to the attempts to describe space-time near the beginning of the
Universe.
Due to the high degree of symmetry observed today in the cosmic microwave
background, cosmologists believe that the early universe was homogenous and
isotropic; see, e.g., [23]. Several physicists have presented arguments that the
primordial space-time should have even more symmetries: that if we have a
finite set of events a1 , . . . , am , and in principle, from the viewpoint of general
causality theory, it is possible to have a new event a which a certain relation
to ai (e.g., a ≤ a1 , a 6≤ a2 , etc.), then such a “theoretically possible” event a
actually exists in the primordial space-time; see, e.g., M. Droste [12].
Here, “theoretically possible” means that there exists another space-time
model in which there are points a0i which are related to each other in the same
way as the points ai , and in which there is another point a0 with the desired
relation to ai .
Similarly, if it is possible to have two events a and b related to ai and to
each other in a certain way, then such events must happen in the primordial
space-time.
Let us describe this idea in precise terms. In this description, we will assume
that the causal relation ≤ is a partial order.
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Definition 3.
• A 1-1 onto mapping f : S → S 0 between partially ordered sets is called a
isomorphism if for every a, b ∈ S, we have a ≤ b ↔ f (a) ≤ f (b).
• We say that an partially ordered set (E, ≤) is universal if for every finite
subset S ⊆ E and for every finite partially ordered set F 0 , if S is isomorphic to a set S 0 ⊆ F 0 , then this isomorphism can be extended to an
isomorphism between the whole set F 0 and some superset F ⊇ S of the
set S.
Due to fundamental reasons dictated by considerations of quantum gravity,
we assume that the space-time is countable; this assumption, first made in R.
Sorkin’s theory of causal sets [28], is used by M. Droste in [12].
Description of the resulting primordial space-time model. It is known
(see, e.g., R. Fraissé [13, 14] and W. Hodges [16]) that there exists a countable
universal partially ordered set. It is also known that all such sets are isomorphic,
and that these sets have a large symmetry groups: every isomorphism f : S → S 0
between two subsets of E can be extended to an isomorphism of the entire space
E.
This means, in particular, that for every two events a, a0 ∈ E, there exists
an isomorphism which maps a into a0 , i.e., that this space-time model is homogeneous. This also means that if a1 < a2 and a01 < a02 , then there exists an
isomorphism of E which maps a1 into a01 and a2 into a02 , etc.
Comment. A similar universal construction for discrete space-time models has
been described by M. Droste [12].
Computational complexity of the decision problem for the primordial
space-time. In the previous section, we have proven that for every non-trivial
space-time model, the corresponding decision problem is PSPACE-hard, and we
have mentioned that, in effect, this means that we cannot solve this problem
faster than in exponential time.
We have also shown that for a seemingly simple Minkowski space-time, the
decision problem is much more difficult: it requires doubly exponential time. Let
us now that for the (seemingly less trivial) primordial space-time, the decision
problem can be actually solved in exponential time – i.e., as fast as possible.
A possible explanation lies in the high symmetry of the primordial spacetime: usually, symmetry helps in computations, and here we have as much
symmetry as potentially possible.
´
³
2
Proposition 3. There exists a polynomial P (n) and an O P (n) · 2n time
algorithm which, given a first order causality formula F0 , decides whether this
formula holds in the universal (primordial) space-time model.
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Proof.
1◦ . By definition, every formula from the first order causality theory is obtained
from the basic formulas of the type a ≤ b by using propositional connectives
and quantifiers. For each given formula F0 , we can thus trace its construction
to the basic formulas and thus, get a sequence of (sub)formulas such that
• the first subformulas are elementary formulas of the type a ≤ b;
• each of the following subformulas is obtained from the previous one(s) by
using a propositional connective or a quantifier; and
• at the end, we get the desired formula.
At the end, we get a closed formula (without free variables), i.e., a formula which
can be true or false. On the intermediate steps of this construction, however,
we can have formulas like a ≤ b which contain free variables. Such formulas are
true or false depending on the values of these variables.
2◦ . In our algorithm, to determine whether the final formula holds or not in
the universal partially ordered set E, we will follow the corresponding sequence
of subformulas. We will show that for each of these subformulas F (a1 , . . . , ak ),
its truth in E depends only on the ≤-relation between the values ai . Thus, all
the information about the truth of each such subformula for different elements
a1 , . . . , ak ∈ E, can be completely determined by listing all the (partial) orders
on the k-element set {a1 , . . . , ak } for which this formula is true in E.
This listing can be equivalently described by a propositional formula of the
type
((a1 ≤ a2 ) & (a2 6≤ a1 ) & . . .) ∨ (. . .) ∨ . . .
in which each conjunction (a1 ≤ a2 ) & (a2 6≤ a1 ) & . . . corresponds to one such
partial order.
In our algorithm, we follow the construction of the formula F0 step by step,
and along the way, construct the corresponding lists for all the subformulas F .
• If the corresponding subformula F is closed, then we will simply generate
the information on whether it is true or not in the set E.
• If the subformula F (a1 , . . . , ak ) has free variables a1 , . . . , ak , then we will
construct a list of all partial orders on the k-element set {a1 , . . . , ak } for
which this subformula is true in E.
At the end of this construction, when we get to the original closed formula, we
will have its truth value.
Let us show how this works.
3◦ . For the elementary formula a1 ≤ a2 , we simply construct the set consisting
of two partial orders:
• an order in which a1 ≤ a2 and a2 6≤ a1 ; and
17

• an order in which a1 ≤ a2 and a2 ≤ a1 .
4◦ . Let us first consider the case when the next formula F (a1 , . . . , ak ) is the
def

negation of the previous one: F (a1 , . . . , ak ) = ¬G(a1 , . . . , ak ). In this case, for
the formula G(a1 , . . . , ak ) with k free variables for which we already have a list
of all partial orders on the set {a1 , . . . , ak } for which this formula G is true in
E.
We need to construct a similar list for the negation ¬G(a1 , . . . , ak ). For
that, we simply generate all the possible partial orders of the set {a1 , . . . , ak }
and then dismiss those from the given list (i.e., those for which G is true).
5◦ . Before we explain how to proceed with other propositional formulas and
quantifiers, let us describe the following auxiliary operation.
In this auxiliary operation, we add a “dummy” variable ak+1 to the formula
F (a1 , . . . , ak ). In other words, we simply add this new variable to the list of
variables, but the truth value of the formula F (a1 , . . . , ak ) is not affected by
this new variable.
From the viewpoint of logic, adding a dummy variable is a trivial construction, because it does not change any truth values. However, from the viewpoint
of our proof, it is non-trivial:
• for the original formula, we have a list of all the partial orders on the
k-element set {a1 , . . . , ak } which satisfy the property F (a1 , . . . , ak );
• for the new formula with a dummy variable added, we need the list of all
partial orders on the (k + 1)-element set {a1 , . . . , ak , ak+1 } which satisfy
the property F (a1 , . . . , ak ).
This new list can be constructed as follows:
• we consider all possible partial orders on the (k + 1)-element set
{a1 , . . . , ak , ak+1 };
• for each of these orders, we delete ak+1 ; if the resulting order on the kelement set is in the originally given list, we add the corresponding order
on the (k + 1)-element set to the new list.
In this manner, we can add any number of such dummy variables.
6◦ . Let us now describe how we can handle the case of a propositional connective
F = G & H or F = G ∨ H.
We assume that we already have lists corresponding to the subformulas G
and H, and we need to construct a new list corresponding to the formula F .
First, if G has free variables which are not in H, then we add these variables
to H as dummy variables. Similarly, if H has free variables which are not in G,
then we add these variables to G as dummy variables.
As a result, we can assume that the formulas G and H have the exact same
set of variables. Then, we proceed as follows:
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• The formula G & H is true for a partial order if and only if both formulas G
and H are true. Thus, the list corresponding to G & H is the intersection
of the lists corresponding to G and H.
• Similarly, the formula G ∨ H is true for a partial order if and only if one
of the formulas G and H are true. Thus, the list corresponding to G ∨ H
is the union of the lists corresponding to G and H.
7◦ . To complete the description of our construction, we need to cover
the quantifiers case, when the subformula F (a1 , . . . , ak ) has the form
∃ak+1 G(a1 , . . . , ak , ak+1 ) or ∀ak+1 G(a1 , . . . , ak , ak+1 ).
Due to de Morgan’s duality, the universal quantifier can be described in
terms of the existential one:
∀ak+1 G(a1 , . . . , ak , ak+1 ) ↔ ¬∃ak+1 ¬G(a1 , . . . , ak , ak+1 ).
Since we already know how to handle the negation, it is sufficient to describe
the construction for the existential quantifier.
We assume that we already have a list of all the partial orders on the (k + 1)element set {a1 , . . . , ak , ak+1 } for which the property G(a1 , . . . , ak , ak+1 ) is true
in E.
As we have mentioned earlier, the existence of such a list means, in effect,
that the formula G(a1 , . . . , ak , ak+1 ) is equivalent to a propositional formula
e 1 , . . . , ak , ak+1 ) of the type
G(a
((a1 ≤ a2 ) & (a2 6≤ a1 ) & . . .) ∨ (. . .) ∨ . . .
which describes all the corresponding partial orders.
According to the above definition of the universal partially ordered set, if
e 1 , . . . , ak , ak+1 ) in some
there is an element ak+1 with the desired relation G(a
partial ordered set, then such an element can be found in this universal set E
as well.
e 1 , . . . , ak , ak+1 ) holds for the elements
Thus, the formula ∃ak+1 G(a
(a1 , . . . , ak ) ∈ E if and only if there exists a partial order on a (k+1)-element set
{a1 , . . . , ak , ak+1 } which extends the given partial order on the set {a1 , . . . , ak }
e 1 , . . . , ak ) holds.
and for which the formula G(a
So, to construct the desired list for the formula ∃ak+1 G(a1 , . . . , ak , ak+1 ), it
is sufficient to consider all partial orders of the (k+1)-order set {a1 , . . . , ak , ak+1 }
from the G-list, and delete the element ak+1 from each of these orders.
8◦ . We have shown that the above construction indeed leads to the desired lists
– hence, at the end, this construction leads to the truth value of the original
formula F0 . To complete the proof,³ we must show
that this algorithm indeed
´
2
finishes its computations in time O P (n) · 2n for some polynomial P (n).
Indeed, for each subformula F , the most time-consuming part is the enumeration of all the partial orders on a k-element set {a1 , . . . , ak }. To describe
each such partial order, we must know, for each pair (i, j) with i = 1, 2, . . . , k
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and j = 1, 2, . . . , k, where ai ≤ aj or not. There are k 2 such pairs, so we need k 2
bits to describe an arbitrary order. Enumerating all such orders thus requires
2
as many steps as there are sequences with k 2 bits, i.e., 2k steps.
For each such sequence of bits, we also need to check whether the resulting
relation is a partial order; this requires polynomial number of steps, so overall,
2
we need ≤ p(k) · 2k steps for some polynomial p(k).
For our algorithm, the input is the formula F0 for which we want to know
whether this formula holds or not. So, the length n of the input is the length
of the given formula F0 . On each intermediate step, the number of variables k
is bounded by the length n of the formula: k ≤ n. Thus, the computational
2
complexity of each subformula is bounded by p(n) · 2n .
The number of subformulas is also bounded by the length n of the input, so
2
def
the overall computation time is bounded by n · p(n) · 2n , where P (n) = n · p(n)
is a polynomial. The proposition is proven.

5

Discussion: Is There Anything in Between?

Formulation of the problem.
two space-time models:

In the previous sections, we have analyzed

• the Minkowski space-time which (reasonably accurately) describes the current space-time, and
• the primordial space-time which seems to provide a reasonable description
of the causality relation at the very beginning of the Universe.
A natural question is: is there anything radically different in between?
In this short section, we will provide an argument that probably we should
not expect anything drastically different.
Symmetry violation as a physically natural way from the primordial
space-time to current (locally Minkowski-like) one. From the physical
viewpoint, one of the important features of different physical processes is their
symmetries.
We have already mentioned that the universal partially ordered set has a lot
of symmetries. These symmetries can be described in the following way.
Definition 4. A mapping f : M → M 0 between ordered sets is called a homomorphism if for every a, b ∈ M for which a ≤ b, we have f (a) ≤ f (b).
Definition 5. [17] Let n > 0 be an integer. We say that an ordered set (M, ≤)
is n−structurally homogeneous if for every isomorphism f : S → S 0 between two
subsets S, S 0 ⊆ M with n or fewer elements, and for every m 6∈ S, there exists
an element m0 6∈ S 0 such that a mapping f , extended to S ∪ {m} by setting
f 0 (m) = m0 , is a homomorphism f 0 : S ∪ {m} → S 0 ∪ {m0 }.
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The universal partially order set is n-structurally homogeneous for every n.
Since our real space-time is different, this means that these symmetries become
violated, i.e., that, instead of n-homogeneity for all n, we only have structural
homogeneity for some n.
In [17], we have shown that, in effect, the standard axioms for causality
as presented in H. Busemann [8], E. H. Kronheimer and R. Penrose [18], and
R. I. Pimenov [25], crudely speaking, correspond to 3-structural homogeneity.
Is there anything in between? To answer this questions, let us first briefly
summarized what we have just discussed.
• The primordial space-time is n-structurally homogeneous for all n.
• After a while, these symmetries are violated, so we only have n-structural
homogeneity for some n.
• The current space-time corresponds to n = 3.
According to this logic, we can, in principle, have intermediate stages corresponding to n > 3, e.g., to n = 4, n = 5, etc. Let us show that, in some
reasonable sense, homogeneity for n = 4 implies homogeneity for all larger n.
Thus, there is indeed nothing drastically different in between.
To explain this result in precise terms, we first need to clarify our brief
description of the main result from [17].
First clarification: we restrict ourselves to kinematic causality. The
first clarification is related to the fact that in the definition of a universal partial
ordered set, we only considered countably many events. The justification for
the possibility to restrict ourselves to countably many events came from the
fact that measurements are never 100% accurate. So, a countable dense set of
events is sufficient to describe all possible measurement results.
Therefore, to make a reasonable comparison between our space-time and
this primordial space-time, we must restrict ourselves to a countable dense set
of events for our space-time as well. In general, if we pick kind of “random”;
dense set, then for each even a, the “probability” to pick another events exactly
on the boundary of the future cone of a is 0. So, in the general case, for this
dense set, the boundary of each future cone is empty, and the causality relation
coincides with the interior of the future cone.
From the physical viewpoint, this interior corresponds to kinematic causality,
i.e., causality via regular particles (which can be at rest). Descriptions from
[8, 18, 25] explicitly require this type of causality.
Second clarification: we restrict ourselves to positive properties of
causality. The properties which form n-structural homogeneity mean that if
some events a1 , . . . , ak are related to each other in some reasonable way, then
there exists a new element a which is related to these elements ai in a known
way.
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Each relation between the original events ai and aj and each relation between
a new event a and the old events ai can be either positive (i.e., of the type
ai < aj ) or negative (i.e., of the type ai 6< aj ). In [17], it was shown that for
the properties formed from the positive relations, 3-structural homogeneity is
indeed naturally equivalent to their standard formulation in [8, 18, 25], while
for negative properties, we had to add additional postulates.
we had to explicitly postulate conclusions related to negative relations, but
we had a good correspondence for the positive ones.
Thus, it is reasonable to restrict ourselves only to positive relations, in which
a causally follows some events ai and causally precedes some other events bj .
Of course, for this to be possible, we must make sure that every “lower bound”
ai causally precedes every “upper bound” bj . The resulting properties can be
classified depending on how many lower bounds and how many upper bounds
we have. The property corresponding to ` lower bounds and u upper bounds
will be described as an (`, u)-property.
For example:
• a (1,1)-property means that if a1 < b1 , then there exists an event a such
that a1 < a < b1 ;
• a (0,2)-property means that for every b1 and b2 , there exists an event a
such that a < b1 and a < b2 ; and
• a (2,0)-property means that for every a1 and a2 , there exists an event a
such that a1 < 1 and a2 < a.
Let us describe this in precise terms.
Definition 6. Let l and u be given natural numbers. We say that a partially ordered set E has a (`, u)-property if for every two tuples a1 , . . . , a` and
b1 , . . . , bu for which ai < bj for all i and j, there exists an element a for which
ai < a < bj for all i and j.
Definition 7. Let n be a positive integer. We say that a partially ordered set
E is positively n-homogeneous if it has the (`, u)-property for all ` and u for
which ` + u ≤ n.
Proposition 4. If a partially ordered set E is positively 4-homogeneous, then
it is positively n-homogeneous for all integers n.
Proof.
1◦ . Since E is positively 4-homogeneous, it has, in particular, the following
three properties:
• it has the (0,2)-property, according to which for every b1 and b2 , there
exists an event a such that a < b1 and a < b2 ;
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• it has the (1,2)-property, according to which for every a1 , b1 , and b2 for
which a1 < b1 and a1 < b2 , there exists an a for which a1 < a, a < b1 ,
and a < b2 ; and
• it has the (2,2)-property: for every four events a1 , a2 , b1 , and b2 for which
ai < bj for each i and j, there exists an a for which ai < a < bj for all i
and j.
Let us show that from these three properties, we can deduce an (`, u)-property
for all possible natural numbers ` and u.
2◦ . Let us first prove that for every ` ≤ 2, the (`, u)-property holds for all u.
To prove this property, we must show that if we have elements a1 , . . . , a` ,
b1 , . . . , bu for which ai < bj for all i and j, then there exists an element a for
which ai < a < bj for all i and j.
We will prove this by induction over u.
2.1◦ . The induction base is straightforward: For u = 2, the existence of the
desired element comes directly from the (0,2)-, (1,2)-, and (2,2)-properties.
2.2◦ . Let us prove the induction step. Let us assume that we have already
proven the (`, u)-property; based on this, we will prove the (`, u + 1)-property.
Indeed, let a1 , . . . , a` , b1 , . . . , bu , bu+1 be any given elements for which ai < bj
for all i and j. By the (`, u)-property, there exists an element a0 for which ai < a0
for all i, and a0 < b1 , a0 < b2 , . . . , a0 < bu .
Now, for a1 , . . . , a` , a0 and bu+1 , we have ai < a0 and ai < bu+1 . So, due
to the (`, 2)-property, there exists an element a for which ai < a, a < a0 and
a < bu+1 . Since a < a0 and a0 < bj for all j ≤ u, by transitivity, we conclude
that a < bj for all j ≤ u; we also know that a < bu+1 . Thus, ai < a < bj for all
i and j.
The induction step is proven, and so is the statement.
3◦ . Now, for every u, we can use a similar induction – this time over ` – to
prove that for every `, we have a (`, u)-property.
3.1◦ . The induction base is straightforward: For ` ≤ 2, the existence of the
desired element a was proven in Part 2 of this proof.
3.2◦ . Let us prove the induction step. Let us assume that we have already
proven the (`, u)-property; based on this, we will prove the (` + 1, u)-property.
Indeed, let a1 , . . . , a` , a`+1 , b1 , . . . , bu be any given elements for which ai < bj
for all i and j. By the (`, u)-property, there exists an element a0 for which
a1 < a0 , . . . , a` < a0 and a0 < bj for all j.
Now, for a0 , a`+1 , b1 , . . . , bu , we have a0 < bi and a`+1 < bi . Thus, due to the
(2, u)-property, there exists an element a for which a0 < a, a`+1 < a, and a < bj
for all j. Since a0 < a and ai < a0 for all i ≤ `, by transitivity, we conclude that
ai < a for all i ≤ `; we also know that a`+1 < a. Thus, ai < a < bj for all i and
j.
The induction step is proven, and so is the statement. The proposition is
proven.
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6

Conclusions

Causality is one of the most fundamental notions of physics. It is therefore
important to be able to decide which statements about causality are correct
in different models of space-time. In this paper, we analyze the computational
complexity of the corresponding decision problems.
We start this analysis by finding a relation between Tarski’s elementary
theory of geometry and the first order theory of causality for Minkowski spacetime. Due to this relation, the decision problem for Minkowski space-time is as
difficult as Tarski’s decision problem for elementary geometry – i.e.,
• requires at least exponential time, and
• can be solved in doubly exponential time.
We hope that the new relation between elementary geometry and causality
theory will lead to even more efficient decision algorithms for physically important classes of causality formulas. Indeed, M. Ben-Or, D. Kozen, J. Reif,
J. Canny, and J. Renegar have shown that many fragments of elementary geometry have a much faster decision procedure. In particular,
• the universal fragment has an exponential-time procedure (J. Renegar),
and
• the entire existential fragment is in PSPACE (J. Canny) – hence, in practice, even more efficient than exponential time.
It is desirable to find physically interesting classes of causality formulas that
correspond to such fragments – e.g., to the existential fragment.
After analyzing Minkowski space-time,
• we show that for every non-trivial space-time model, the corresponding
decision problem is PSPACE-hard, and
• we produce a reasonable model of primordial space-time for which the
decision problem is in PSPACE.
In the final section, we provide arguments that from the viewpoint of computational complexity, a general space-time should be similar either to Minkowski
space-time or to the above primordial model.
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